COMMENTS
SELF-SUFFICIENCY UNDER THE EDUCATION
FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
ACT: A SUGGESTED JUDICIAL

APPROACH
There are approximately eight million handicapped Americans
under the age of twenty-one.' The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 19752 (the Act) is the most comprehensive legislation
to date aimed at providing federal assistance to the states in their attempt to furnish handicapped children 3 with a "free appropriate public
education."'4 Because the Act fails to define explicitly the parameters of
the "full educational opportunity" it calls for, 5 however, courts have
faced difficulty when called upon to decide whether the content of an
the local or
individual child's educational program is sufficient to bring
6
Act.
the
with
compliance
into
agency
educational
state
1. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PROGRESS
TOWARD A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAW 94-142: THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT 16

(1979).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976).
3. The Act defines "handicapped children" broadly enough to bring within its purview children afflicted with virtually any physical, mental, or emotional problem requiring special education and related services. Id. § 1401(1). Seealso Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1226
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5 (1979).
4. A state receiving funds under the Act must provide "a free appropriate public education"
to all handicapped children within the state between the ages of three and twenty-one. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(2)(B) (1976). For a brief discussion of the history of federal legislation in this field, see
note 67 infra.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A)(i) (1976). Although the Act explicitly details the procedures states
must follow in qualifying for federal funds and in arriving at educational placement decisions for
individual children, the Act's substantive provisions are drafted in broad and inclusive language.
See notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text.
6. The most striking example is Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
modedsub non. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). See text accompanying notes 37-46 infra. See also Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), appeal
pending, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1980) (No. 80-1002); Kenny, Educationofll the Handicapped, 12 URB. LAW. 505, 508 (1980). Courts have frequently looked to the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), for guidance. See, e.g., Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist.,
464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F.
Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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Most cases arise under the Act when the parents of a handicapped
child sue a local or state educational agency, charging that the agency

has violated the Act's procedural guarantees or has failed to provide

the child with a particular service allegedly required by the Act.7 The
fundamental conflict among the courts is whether the Act requires that

educational programs include, at a minimum, all educational services
necessary to make handicapped children self-sufficient, or whether the

Act can be satisfied by educational programs aimed at a lesser goal.8
An authoritative pronouncement of the extent to which programs
under the Act must be aimed at self-sufficiency is necessary to resolve
the dilemma. 9

Until such a pronouncement, however, courts will continue to face
the difficult task of construing the Act. 10 This comment addresses that
task." After outlining the structure of the Act in Part

1,12

the comment

focuses in Part II on the Act's legislative history to show that the Act
was intended to reconcile the need to protect the rights of handicapped

children with the need to preserve the local nature of education.1 3 The
comment argues that the Act requires a state to provide, at a minimum,
those services necessary to enable the child to achieve the maximum
7. The analysis in this comment will be from the perspective of the handicapped children
because the majority of litigation under the Act is initiated on their behalf. The points for consideration are equally applicable, however, when a school or state is the plaintiff. See, e.g., Lawrence
T. v. Julia T., 103 Misc. 2d 1075, 427 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Fain. Ct. 1980) (the Commissioner of Social
Services sued the parents of a handicapped child, seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred in
supporting the child).
8. See notes 36-46 infra and accompanying text. Whether termed self-sufficiency, maximum
independence, or by some other label, the concept of self-sufficiency denotes the status of being
able to provide for the basic needs of one's own life so as to minimize one's need for societal
support. Authorities in the field of education agree that self-sufficiency is the proper goal of education in general, and of rehabilitative education in particular. See I. DICKMAN, INDEPENDENT
LIVING: NEw GOAL FOR DISABLED PERSONS (1975); M. JACQUES, REHABILITATION COUNSELING: SCOPE AND SERvicEs 4 (1970); F. PAULSEN, A SYSTEM OF ETmcs 641 (1899).
9. See notes 45-46 infra and accompanying text.
10. Even after the substantive requirements of the Act are legislatively stated, courts must
continue to decide whether an individual child's educational program meets those standards. The
considerations in this decision are discussed at notes 113-58 infra and accompanying text.
11. This comment does not make a detailed examination of the history of the right to education for handicapped children, or of the broader constitutional issues involved in the right to
education generally. Neither does this comment address issues arising from the procedural requirements of the Act. The history of the right to education for the handicapped is discussed in
Blakely, Judicialand LegqilativeAttitudes To wardthe Right to an Equal Educationforthe Handicapped, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 606-13 (1979). The possibility of a constitutional right to education
is raised in Comment, The Right to Education/orMental Retarded Children, 43 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. Rnv. 79, 80-82 (1974). For a discussion of the procedural issues arising under the Act, see
Note, The Education oftllHandcappedChildren c1t of1975, l0 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 110, 136-51
(1976).
12. See notes 16-29 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 30-112 infra and accompanying text.
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level of self-sufficiency that is reasonable in his case; it then suggests an
appropriate standard of review. Part III of the comment discusses the
proper judicial considerations for determining whether a child's educational program must include a particular educational service alleged to
be necessary to achieve maximum self-sufficiency in the specific case. 14
The comment concludes that Congress or the Department of Education
should clearly state that educational programs administered under the
reasonably aimed at
Act must include, at a minimum, every service
5
making the individual child self-sufficient.1

I.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ACT

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197516 is primarily a funding vehicle to assist the states in providing education for
handicapped children.' 7 To receive federal funds, states must meet the
requirements of the Act, the most explicit of which are procedural.' 8
For example, a recipient state's plan for educating handicapped children must be approved by the Secretary of Education.' 9 In addition,
the state must demonstrate to the Secretary that it "has in effect a policy
that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate
public education." 20 The state is required to describe in detail the policies and procedures it undertakes to assure that right.2 1 It must also
establish priorities for the education of handicapped children,2 2 and
must ensure that local educational agencies will implement the individualized education programs mandated by the Act. 23 Finally, the state
and placement procedures are not
must demonstrate that its evaluation 24
racially or culturally discriminatory.
14. See notes 113-58 infra and accompanying text.

15. See notes 159-62 infra and accompanying text.
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976).
17. The Act's statement of purpose declares that "it is in the national interest that the Federal
Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of

handicapped children...

..Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a), 89 Stat. 775 (1975). See Loughran v.

Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Conn. 1979) ("The chief function of the Act is to serve as a
funding vehicle for the states in their efforts to provide educational opportunities for the handicapped"). See also New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487,

503 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). For a brief description of how funding for a state is determined, see note 81
infra-.
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976).
19. Id. § 1413. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 3441(a) (West Supp. 1980) (transferring responsibility for
administering the Act from the Commissioner of Education to the Secretary of Education).

20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976).
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

1412(2).
1412(3).
1412(4).
1412(5).
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Decisions concerning a particular child's education are made on

the basis of an individualized education program-a written program
developed at a meeting of educators, the child, and his parents, detailing the child's present educational performance level, his appropriate
educational objectives and means to achieve those objectives, and
proper criteria for evaluating the child's progress. 25 The Act calls for
annual review and revision of the individualized program 26 and specifies procedural safeguards designed to maximize parental involvement

in the placement decision. A child's parents or guardian, for example,
must be given notice and an opportunity to present complaints whenever the local agency changes or refuses to change its evaluation of the
child.27 If the guardian or parents make a complaint, they are entitled
to an impartial hearing before a hearing examiner or the state educational agency.2 8 Any aggrieved party may appeal from the examiner to
29
the state agency, and from the state agency to a state or federal court.

II.
A.

INTERPRETING THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT

The Substantive Vagueness of the Act.
The substantive requirements imposed by the Act are few, and

they are broadly stated. In addition to mandating a "free appropriate
education, '30 the Act requires states to establish "a goal of providing
full educational opportunity to all handicapped children." 31 The most
explicit substantive requirement is that handicapped children be edu-

cated with nonhandicapped children "to the maximum extent appropriate." 32 This requirement, known as mainstreaming, was included in
25. Id. § 1401(19).
26. Id. § 1414(a)(5).
27. Id. § 1415(b)(1)(C).
28. Id. § 1415(b)(2).
29. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
30. Id. § 1412(2)(B). The Act defines a "free appropriate education" as "special education"
and related services that
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved,
and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required
under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id. § 1401(18); see 45 C.F.R. § 121a.4 (1979). "Special education" is defined as "specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction,
and instruction in hospitals and institutions.' 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976); see 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.14(a)(1) (1979). "Related services" are those that "may be required to assist a handicapped
" 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); see 45 C.F.R.
child to benefit from special education ....
§ 121a.13(a) (1979).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A)(i) (1976).
32. Id. § 1412(5)(B); see 45 C.F.R. § 121a.551 (1979).
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the statutory language only after extensive debate. 33 In light of the
highly individualized nature of education for the handicapped, 34 and in
light of the difficulty with which even so broad a provision as mainstreaming was enacted, it is not surprising that Congress did not include more detailed substantive requirements in the Act.35
The Act's substantive vagueness has produced conflict within and
among courts faced with determining whether a handicapped child's
program of education satisfies the Act. 36 The most dramatic example is
Battle v. Pennsylvania,37 in which handicapped children and their parents sued in federal district court, alleging that Pennsylvania's policy of
providing no more than 180 days of school annually for any child violated the children's rights under the Act. The district court concluded
that the Act entitled the plaintiffs to an education aimed at developing
38
maximum self-sufficiency within the limitations of their handicaps.
The district court then held that because the lengthy interruptions in
training occasioned by the 180-day rule caused the handicapped children to lose the skills they had acquired, the rule ran afoul of their right
39
to an "appropriate" education.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but held that
the Act did not specifically require the goal of self-sufficiency: "Rather,
the Act contemplates that in the first instance each state shall have the
responsibility of setting individual educational goals and reasonable
33. See H.1. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 9 (1975). The policy of educating handicapped children in the same teaching environment as normal children is widely accepted as a
beneficial approach to the education of the handicapped. The main objection to the Act's requirement of mainstreaming is that government should not overly restrict educators in making the
individual evaluation of whether mainstreaming is appropriate in a given case. See AMicus,

April 1977, at 6 (suggesting that federal statutes should not require specific teaching strategies).
But see Powers, Science andArt inMainstreamEducatiomn TowardtheNormalizationof theHandicapped Child, AMIcus, June 1977, at 37.
34. See Krass, The Right to PublicEducationforHandicappedChildrewn A Primerforthe New
Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1025; Stafford, Educationfor the Handicapped-A Senator's

Perspective, 3 VT. L. Rav. 71 (1978) (Senator Stafford was one of the drafters of the Act). The
many factors to be considered in determining whether a particular educational service is required
in a given case are discussed at notes 113-58 in/ra and accompanying text.
35. The Office of Education faced similar difficulties with respect to the Act's substantive
regulations. In drafting 45 C.F.R. § 121a (1979), the Office of Education avoided specific substan-

tive regulations because of the complexity and unsettled nature of the science of learning disabilities. See 41 Fed. Reg. 52,404-05 (1976).
36. See note 6 supra.
37. 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80827).

38. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1979), modojiedsub nom. Battle v.
Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981)

(No. 80-827).
39. 476 F. Supp. at 605.

Vol. 1981:516]

EDUCATION.FOR THE HANDICAPPED

521

means to attain these goals."'40 The court concluded that the 180-day
rule was invalid because it precluded the state from providing the indi1
vidualized treatment required by the Act.4
Judge Sloviter concurred in the result, arguing that the Act requires self-sufficiency to be the ultimate goal but allows the states
freedom in implementing that goal.42 For this reason Judge Sloviter
agreed with the district court's ruling that the 180-day rule violated the
children's right to a free appropriate public education.43 Judge
Sloviter's conclusion was somewhat more restrictive than the district
court's, however, she recognized the need to limit the children's right to
that degree of self-sufficiency possible within the reasonable limits of
state resources. 44 Battle v. Pennsylvania thus exemplifies the conflict
over the degree to which educational programs funded under the Act
must be aimed at achieving self-sufficiency.
B.

CongressionalIntent.

The Battle court was unanimous in calling for an authoritative determination of the goal of the Act. The majority noted that in refusing
to decide whether the Act requires self-sufficiency as the goal of a
handicapped child's education, it was probably only delaying a decision on the matter. 45 Judge Sloviter based her opinion on her belief
that "elucidation of the principal goal of the statute is essential to any
interpretation of its provisions, whether they are substantive or procedural."' 6 An analysis of the Act's goal must begin with an examination
of its legislative history.
1. Possible Interpretations. One interpretation of the Act is that
Congress intended to require states to provide children with all educational services necessary to achieve self-sufficiency in every case, regardless of expense or other limitations. But the legislative history of
the Act suggests that Congress did not intend to adopt such an extreme
position. Congress first considered whether handicapped children have
40. 629 F.2d at 276.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 284-85 (Sloviter, L, concurring and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 284 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 284, 286 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 281 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 284 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in part). The need for judicial interpretation of the substantive goal of the Act is discussed in Note, Enforcing the Right to an '4ppropriate"Educatioxn The Educationfor411HandicappedChildrenAct of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1103,
1127 (1979). See also the authorities cited in note 6 supra.
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a right to an education aimed at self-sufficiency. 47 Although it is not
clear whether there is a constitutional right to such a thoroughgoing
education, 48 Congress believed that handicapped children do have the
right to some minimum level of education.49 While making frequent
mention of the goal of self-sufficiency, the Act's legislative history con47. Cited in the Act's legislative history are the leading cases of Mills v. Board of Educ., 348
F. Supp. 866, 874-76 (D.D:C. 1972), and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modfed, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295-97 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
both of which indicate that there may be a right to a free public education. See S. REP. No. 168,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 22-23 (1975), reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425,
1430-31, 1446-47. These and other "right to education" cases are discussed in Haggerty & Sacks,
Education of the Handicapped"Towards a Defnition ofan AppropriateEducation, 50 TEMP. L.Q.
961, 964-84 (1977); Handel, The Role of theAdvocate in Securing the HandicappedChild'sRight to
an Effective MinimalEducation,36 OHIo ST. L.J. 349,356-57 (1975); Krass,supra note 34, at 102663; Note, supra note 11, at 113 n.20.
48. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of education is to
enable students to become self-sufficient, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and that education is "perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments," id. Furthermore, the Court has held that states that
compel attendance at public schools are "constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause
... ." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). The Court has also ruled, however, that there is
no fundamental constitutional right to an education. See San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973). The Supreme Court has not been faced with the equal
protection and due process claims that have been made on behalf of retarded children in several
lower federal court cases, but these cases strongly suggest that, insofar as states provide normal
children with education, handicapped children have a constitutional right to an education aimed
at self-sufficiency. See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, maodfed, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). One state supreme court
has explicitly held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution gives handicapped children the right to an education. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d
441, 447 (N.D. 1974). See generally Krass,supra note 34, at 1046-47.
49. The Act's legislative history states that
the right to education of handicapped children is a present right, one which should be
implemented immediately ... .Congress. . .has a responsibility to assure equal protection of the laws and thus to take action to assure that handicapped children throughout the United States have available to them appropriate educational services.
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 17, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425,

1441. A case decided shortly after the drafting of the Act provides further support for the assertion that handicapped children have the right to a minimum education. In Fialkowski v. Shapp,
405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975), suit was brought on behalf of retarded children, claiming that
the school violated the children's right to equal protection and due process by attempting to teach
them academic subjects rather than essential self-help skills such as eating, walking, and dressing.
Despite the defendants' argument under San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), that the plaintiffs had no claim because there is no fundamental right to an education, the district court held that the plaintiffs had raised a colorable equal protection question. 405
F. Supp. at 958. The district court considered it consistent with Rodriguez to hold that "there
exists a constitutional right to a certain minimum level of education as opposed to a constitutional
right to a particular level of education." Id. That the Act has been found to fall within the
purview of federal civil rights statutes further indicates the fundamental nature of the rights the
Act guarantees. See, ag., Medley v. Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976)); Cruz v. Collazo, 84 F.RD. 307 (D.P.R. 1979) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)).
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sistently indicates Congress's recognition that no two handicapped children will have identical needs.5 0 For this reason the legislative history

calls for an "appropriate" education, a term flexible enough to provide
for all children, whether or not they can be educated to self-sufficiency. 5 ' The vagueness of the Act's substantive provisions 52 indicates

Congress's desire to avoid an approach that would require every imaginable service for the handicapped, but its legislative history makes
plain that Congress also meant to further the national goal of self-sufficiency for handicapped Americans.5 3 The Act was not intended, however, to create an absolute statutory right to an education resulting in
too complex to
self-sufficiency; Congress was aware that the issue was
54
warrant such a broad and indiscriminate approach.

Congress's awareness of the need to preserve the local nature of
education 55 also indicates that the Act was not meant to impose a rigid
requirement of self-sufficiency on the states. Federal involvement in
education erodes the freedom of the states to make policy in that area,
and that erosion occurs regardless of whether the federal involvement
is aimed at the needs of an identifiable group or at providing federal

funds for education in general.5 6 Authorities generally agree that states
should allocate their own resources, and it is therefore within the states'
prerogative to determine the nature of local education. 57 A state is not
58
required to accept federal funds under voluntary statutes like the Act,

50. See, eg., S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 10, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1434. See also Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education/orAll
HandicappedChildrenAct of 1975, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 213, 264 (1980).
51. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47.
52. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
53. Congressional debates prior to the Act's passage contain statements such as the following:
Failure to provide appropriate educational services for all handicapped children
results in public agencies and taxpayers spending billions of dollars over the lifetime of
these individuals to maintain them as dependents in minimally acceptable life styles.
Yet, providing appropriate educational services now means that many of these individuals will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they will not have to
depend on subsistence payments from public funds.
121 CONG. REc. 19,492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See also id. 25,541 (remarks of Rep.
Harkin); id. 37,416 (remarks of Sen. Williams); S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 9, reprintedin
[1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1433.
54. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text.
56. Compare Griffith, The U.S. Department of Education and the Issue of Control of Education, 12 URB. LAW. 500, 502-03 (1980) (the federal government should be restricted to its traditional role of serving special needs), with Rossmiller, Full State Funding of Education, in Six
CRUCIAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION 12 (1972) ("Experience indicates that categorical federal aids are
more likely to distort local decisions than are general federal aids").
57. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974). See generally Dam, The American
FiscalConstitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271, 304-20 (1977).
58. New Mexico is the only state that has not submitted a planned program under the Act.
Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate EducationforLearning DisabledChildren, 12 VAL.
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but once it does, a contractual relationship arises that obligates the state
to accept the conditions of the federal grant.5 9 When a state accepts
federal funds under the Act, the provisions of the Act therefore supersede conflicting state law. 60 Courts have recognized that the conditions
imposed by the Act greatly restrict local and state discretion in the area
61
of education.
Aware of the Act's potentially destructive impact on local decision-making, the drafters of the Act were concerned that it reflect due
regard for state and local sovereignty. 62 In other education statutes,
Congress has expressed this same interest in preserving the freedom of
action of state and local authorities. 63 Congress's concern that education remain primarily a local prerogative indicates that Congress did
not intend the Act to impose on the states a rigid program mandating
U. L. REv. 253, 277 & n.135 (1978). New Mexico's program for educating handicapped children
is found in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-21 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
59. See Griffith, supra note 56, at 502. The voluntary nature of the Act precludes litigants
from attacking the Act under National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In that case
the Supreme Court invalidated certain amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch.
676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)). The amendments
extended wage and hour provisions to cover most state and local employees. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 58 (1974) (repealed). The Court
held that Congress had acted outside its authority under the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, because extending wage and hour requirements to state and local employees "displaces
state policies regarding the manner in which [states and their political subdivisions]... structure
delivery of those governmental services which their citizens require." 426 U.S. at 847. Using
more general language, the Court stated: 'There are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
state government which may not be impaired by Congress... because the Constitution prohibits
[Congress] from exercising ... authority in that matter." Id. at 845.
Although the NationalLeague of Cities Court limited its holding to the extension of federal
wage and hour provisions under the commerce power, id. at 852 n.17, the Supreme Court has
implied that among a state's "attributes of sovereignty" is the power to provide education. Id. at
855 (dictum). See Griffith, supra note 56, at 503. The voluntary nature of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, however, removes the Act from the purview of NationalLeague of
Cities. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), ceri.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980). In Haiderman persons confned at a school and hospital for the
mentally retarded brought suit under, inter alia, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976). That act, like the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, imposes its requirements only on those states choosing to receive funds. The
Halderman court noted that any arguments the school might otherwise have made under National
League of Cities were vitiated by the elective nature of the funding statute. 612 F.2d at 98-99 &
n.21.
60. Vogel v. School Bd., 491 F. Supp. 989, 993 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Accord,In re "A" Family,
602 P.2d 157, 165-66 (Mont. 1979).
61. Eg., Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 231 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
62. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 13,25, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1437, 1449. See also Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). Stafford, supra note 34, at 78.
63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (1976) (forbidding federal programs from controlling the local
curriculum or the school administration). See also id. § 3403 (Supp. I1 1979) (the establishment
of the Department of Education shall not increase federal authority over local education).
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that they go to all extremes to provide handicapped children with an
education aimed at self-sufficiency.
Another interpretation of congressional intent is that the Act
merely encourages states to educate handicapped children toward self-

sufficiency. 64 Under this view, the Act never requires that a child's
educational program be aimed at self-sufficiency; the state complies

with the Act simply by providing the handicapped child with some
educational program. The legislative history suggests, however, that
Congress intended more than simple encouragement. 65 Congress was

well aware that, because of the cost of caring for handicapped Americans who are dependent on society for support, the national interest is

66
well served by making the handicapped as self-sufficient as possible.
Congress's growing concern for the plight of the handicapped is re-

flected in the historical trend toward greater federal involvement in the

field of education for the handicapped. 67 In addition, the Act's strict
procedural requirements 68 indicate that Congress intended to prevent

states from cutting financial corners or otherwise capriciously providing for the educational needs of individual children. These require-

ments suggest that Congress meant to do more than merely permit
64. This is the position taken by the majority in Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). See text accompanying
notes 37-41 supra.
65. It is clear that, at the very least, the Act encourages the goal of self-sufficiency. See note
53 supra.
66. The report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee stated:
The long range implications. . . are that public agencies and taxpayers will spend
billions of dollars over the lifetimes of [handicapped Americans] to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead
of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their
independence, thus reducing their dependence on society.
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 9, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1433.
See also note 53 supra.
67. Congress first addressed the problem of providing special education for the handicapped
in 1966 by adding Title VI to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750,
80 Stat. 1191 (1966). Title VI created the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped to serve as a
research center. Congress repealed Title VI in 1970 and enacted the Elementary and Secondary
Education Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) (codified in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.), to expand the Bureau's authority to include the power to provide grants for
the study and upgrading of educational programs for the handicapped.
Further amendments were made in 1974 to provide greater federal control over the identification, evaluation, and education of handicapped children. See Education of the Handicapped
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). Finally, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 was passed. See Pub.
L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976)); S. REP. No. 168,
supra note 47, at 5-6, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1429-30.
68. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text.
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educational programs funded under the Act to be aimed at achieving
self-sufficiency.

2. A PreferredInterpretation. The most satisfactory view is that
Congress, in establishing the goal of full educational opportunity, intended to require states to provide every feasible service reasonably

necessary to enable the handicapped child to reach his maximum educational potential. Full educational opportunity will entail different
goals and therefore different services for each child, depending on the
severity of his handicap.

Under this view, severely handicapped children must receive
whatever services are reasonably necessary to move them toward self69
sufficiency, even if actual attainment of self-sufficiency is impossible.

For these children maximum educational achievement may consist of
merely learning to dress themselves, feed themselves, and toilet them-

selves.70 Moderately handicapped children, too, must receive all serv-

ices necessary to enable them to achieve the maximum level of self-

sufficiency reasonable in each case. 71 As the educational objective for
these children, self-sufficiency may entail learning to buy groceries,72 to
use public transportation, or to live in a community environment.
Mildly handicapped children who achieve self-sufficiency still
have the right to full educational opportunity. For these children the
state must provide whatever additional services are necessary to enable
them to reach their maximum educational potential, even if these serv69. Self-sufficiency does not necessarily mean the maximum self-sufficiency of which a particular child is capable. All three opinions in Battle recognized this. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629
F.2d 269, 279 n.ll (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80827); id. at 283 (Van Dusen, J., concurring); id. at 286 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in
part). See notes 37-46 supra and accompanying text. The limitations on the statutory goal of selfsufficiency are discussed at notes 113-58 infra and accompanying text.
70. An indication of the concrete educational goals typically set for these severely handicapped children can be found in the factual background of cases litigated under the Act. See, e.g.,
Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1980 ) (typical goals include toilet training,
dressing, feeding, communication, counting, making change, and identifying simple words), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827); Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169,
170-71 (D. Del. 1980) (the child's educational program called for speech therapy, occupational
therapy, and physical therapy), af'd sub nom. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642
F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (parents of
children argued that children needed to learn self-help skills such as dressing, eating, and walking).
71. See Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Conn. 1979).
72. An indication of the concrete educational goals typically set for these moderately handicapped children can be found in the factual background of cases litigated under the Act. See, e.g.,
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 646 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (the
board of education provided programs to teach social and occupational skills enabling the moderately handicapped to function in the community and in normal occupational settings).
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ices are beyond the goal of self-sufficiency. 73 These services will be
aimed at minimizing the detrimental effects of the handicap. 74 For ex-

ample, in the case of an eleventh-grade child of normal intelligence
who reads at an eighth-grade level because of a hearing defect, the state

must provide those services necessary to enable the child to read at an
eleventh-grade level even though an eighth-grade reading level is

enough to make the child self-sufficient. On the other hand, the state is
not required to provide the handicapped child with educational serv-

ices that are not provided to nonhandicapped children of comparable
age or intelligence. 75 Thus the state need not provide an advanced
calculus course for a handicapped child who has an unusually high

potential, when such a calculus course is not available to nonhandicapped children.

Because the most divisive litigation under the Act often involves

children who are severely or moderately handicapped, 76 for whom the

goal of self-sufficiency is all-important, that class of cases provides the
primary perspective from which this comment will analyze the criteria
that determine whether a child's educational program fulfills the Act's
requirement of full educational opportunity. 77 For these children the
Act sets the goal of achieving the maximum self-sufficiency that is rea-

sonable under the circumstances, but lets the states and local educational agencies determine the particular educational services that are
78
necessary to achieve that goal in each individual case.
73. See, e.g., Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a bright child
with a hearing defect is entitled to the services of a sign language interpreter in the classroom in
order to enable the child to achieve her full potential), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), appeal
pending, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1980) (No. 80-1002); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.
Supp. 110, 112 (D. Conn. 1979) (the plaintiff alleged that an inadequate educational program
prevented him from functioning at his full intellectual capacity).
74. See, e.g., Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 635
(S.D. Tex. 1978) (special educational services had been provided to overcome the organic brain
damage and anxiety that prevented a child of normal intelligence from achieving normal progress
in school); Eberle v. Board of Pub. Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D. Pa. 1977) (a child of aboveaverage intelligence, afflicted with profound hearing loss, required special instruction to enable
him to reach his optimal development).
75. The regulations promulgated under the Act state that an appropriate education entails
the provision of services that are "designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped
persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met .... ", See 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.33(b) (1980). See also Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), appealpending,49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1980) (No. 801002). See note 69 supra.
76. See notes 37-46 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 113-58 infra and accompanying text. Although analyzed in this comment in
terms of self-sufficiency, many of these criteria are of equal importance when the child seeks
services that go beyond self-sufficiency.
78. The language of the Act supports this interpretation. While the congressional goal of
self-sufficiency is clear, see note 53 supra, the Act defines a child's individualized educational
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C. Accommodating the Local Nature of Education.
In reviewing cases arising under the Act, courts must be aware of
the competing concerns of the Congress that drafted the Act. The Act's

language and legislative history indicate that Congress intended to se-

79
cure to handicapped children the right to an appropriate education.

But Congress was also aware that concern for the individual child's
welfare must be balanced against the principle of preserving the local
nature of education in order to prevent unnecessary judicial intrusion

into state and local decisions about educational policy. 0 Courts deciding cases concerning an individual child's educational program must
integrate these competing considerations. An effective understanding
of the court's relationship with the locality requires a closer look at the
impact a court's ruling may have on a state or local school district.
Because the Act does not provide for the entire cost of a handicapped child's education,81 a court's decision that a child must be given
a particular educational service may drain state and local funds82 and
create an expensive need for competent personnel. 83 The financial burprogram, for which the state is responsible, as including "a statement of annual goals, including
short-term instructional objectives." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(B) (1976). See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
This approach harmonizes the two conflicting interpretations of the purpose of the Act found
in Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June
22, 1981) (No. 80-827). See notes 37-46 supra and accompanying text. In that case the majority
held that the Act does not set a specific goal of self-sufficiency, but rather leaves the states to set
individual goals for each child. 629 F.2d at 278. Judge Sloviter, like the district court below,
argued that the Act does require the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency. Id. at 284, 286-87 (Sloviter,
J., concurring and dissenting in part).
The Battle majority suggested that a policy statement by the Department of Education to the
effect that the Act's goal is self-sufficiency for the handicapped would be helpful. Id. at 281 (majority opinion). A court is more willing to construe a statute according to congressional intent
when the interpretation the court approves has been adopted by the agency charged with the
primary responsibility for administering the legislation, in light of its special experience and expertise. Los Angeles Mailers Local 9 v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 121, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But see Eberle
v. Board of Pub. Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41, 44 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (the intent of Congress rather than of
the Secretary of Education controls the interpretation of the Act). The Act's implicit grant of
broad interpretative leeway has been noted in Note, supra note 46, at 1105, 1113.
79. See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text.
80. The criteria that determine the extent of a child's rights under the Act are discussed at
notes 113-58 infra and accompanying text. For an indication of Congress's concern for federalism, see notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
81. Section 1411(a)(1) of the Act determines the amount of funds a state receives by multiplying the number of handicapped students the state serves by a fixed dollar amount that is not
necessarily related to the actual cost of an individual child's education. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(l)
(1976). See Note, supra note 46, at 1109 & n.43.
82. Most of the cost of local education is paid out of funds derived from state and local taxes;
the federal contribution is comparatively small. See C. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 87-128 (2d ed. 1968); Dam, sufpra note 57, at 301.
83. See Note, supra note 46, at 1110.
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den will be even greater where the court awards damages.8 4 If the
court's decision is seen as overtaxing the financial resources or adminis-

trative talent available to the school system, states may choose to forego

federal funds rather than comply with the Act. 85 A state's decision to

opt out of the Act may indicate strong feelings that allocation of educational funds is a local prerogative, and may therefore suggest that the

Act is being construed more restrictively than Congress intended.
On the other hand, the Act clearly requires that states make certain expenditures, and provides federal funds in order to compensate

for increased local costs. 86 The Act is sensitive to a state's legitimate
financial concerns; "appropriate education" does not mean the best ed-

87
ucation a state could give if it had unlimited financial resources.
Rather, "appropriate education" means that available funds must be
spent equitably so that handicapped children do not bear the brunt of a
88
state's financial limitations.
Imposing federal requirements on the states limits local freedom in
other ways as well. Because education generally reflects local values

and interests, 89 a court should bear in mind that its judgment may to

some degree be viewed as second-guessing collective community wisdom.90 The importance of local control of education should encourage
84. It is not clear to what extent damages are available under the Act. Although the Act does
not specifically authorize a private action for damages, the broad language of the Act and its
legislative history led one court to hold that such actions are permissible. See Boxall v. Sequoia
Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979). See also S. CONF. REP. No.
455, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1975), reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1480, 1503.
Another court, however, has held that the Act does not countenance a private action for damages.
See Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Conn. 1979). The damages plaintiffs seek
most frequently under the Act are for expenses incurred by parents in educating their handicapped children. See, e.g., Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. at 1111;
Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Md. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir.

1980).
When damages are sought in a federal court, the court must consider whether the eleventh
amendment limits the power of the federal judiciary to award damages under the Act. See Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Expare Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908). This line of cases holds that although the eleventh amendment does not bar the federal courts from enjoining the unconstitutional acts of state officials, it does prevent the federal
courts from ordering retroactive relief when that relief is in effect an award of damages assessed
against a state treasury.
85. See note 59 supra.
86. See note 81 supra.
87. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 281-83 (3d Cir. 1980) (Van Dusen, J., concurring), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827); Note, supra note 46, at
1125-26 (suggesting an approach that defines "appropriate education" in terms of available
financial resources).
88. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
89. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
90. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). In that case welfare recipients
challenged the constitutionality of the state's method for calculating welfare payments. Though
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a court to exercise restraint in deciding cases under the Act. A court

must also consider whether its ruling is likely to discourage local edu-

cational innovation 9' or drive away important local personnel. 92 Be-

cause a key aim of the Act is to encourage local inventiveness, 93 a
ruling that has the opposite effect would run counter to congressional
intent. 94 All these considerations indicate that, when possible, a court
should defer to local authorities in matters relating to fiscal and educational policy.95
The administrative remedies that the Act provides are perhaps the
best way to reconcile the need to maintain local control over education
with the need to protect each child's rights.9 6 Resolution of disputes at

the administrative level maintains local input in the decision-making
process and provides faster remedies for the plaintiff child. A court
should therefore require use of the Act's administrative remedies in

most cases.
the state increased a family's benefits with each additional child, it ceased providing these incre-

ments once a family reached a certain size. The Court concluded that the state was properly
exercising its discretion in allocating resources and that the Constitution does not empower a court
to second-guess that allocation. The Dandridge Court applied a "rational basis" standard because
the welfare rule involved neither suspect classifications nor abridgement of fundamental rights.
Id. at 484-87. Cases brought under the Act may justify a stricter standard of review, depending
on the extent to which the reviewing court finds handicapped children to be a suspect class or finds
a fundamental right at stake. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1275-76 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (emotionally handicapped students might be characterized as a suspect class); Fialkowski v.
Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (retarded children might be a suspect class). But
see Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 230 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (the court "seriously doubts" that the
handicapped are a suspect class); see notes 11, 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
91. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,42-43, 49-50 (1973).
92. No agency, teacher, or other person may be held accountable under the Act's implementing regulations if the child does not achieve the growth projected in the Individualized Education
Program. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.349 (1979). See Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn.
1979). In refusing to find that the Act implied a private cause of action for damages, the Flanders
court noted that to impose liability would make local school officials hesitant to implement new
educational techniques for fear of exposing themselves to liability if the innovations fail. Id. at
115. But see Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.
Tex. 1978) (the court raised the possibility of imposing personal liability upon school board members for their failure to comply with the Act's procedural requirements).
93. See Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Conn. 1979); H.R. REP. No. 805,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1974), reprintedin[1974] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 4093, 4139 (a
goal of all federal special education efforts is to "initiate, expand, and improve" education for the
handicapped).
94. See Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Conn. 1979). See also Note, supra
note 46, at 1108-09.
95. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277-79 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827).
96. The Act provides for administrative decision-making by neutral representatives of state,
local, or intermediate educational units. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(2), 1415(c) (1976). See notes 28-29
supra and accompanying text.
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Generally, when the Act's administrative remedies are adequate to
handle the plaintiffs claim, they must be exhausted before a party can
seek redress in court. 97 In those cases in which exhaustion of the Act's
administrative remedies cannot be required, a court may nonetheless
compel the parties to proceed through administrative channels before
seeking judicial action. 98 Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 99

a court properly having jurisdiction over a case may refer the matter to

an administrative agency' 0 0 when the case involves questions that are
within the agency's special field of expertise and outside the competence of the court.' 0 ' The main purpose of the doctrine is to avoid the
conflict between court and administrative agency that may arise from

the court's lack of expertise in the area or inexperience with agency
policy. 02 A court may also refer a case arising under the Act to an
administrative decision-maker when the trial process itself threatens
the welfare of the handicapped child in a way that an administrative
proceeding would not. 10 3 By referring a case to the agency, the court

achieves the twin goals of avoiding unnecessary conflict between court
97. Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074-86 (D. Neb. 1980). Exhaustion is not required
when adequate administrative remedies are not available. See Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225,
228 (N.D. Ind. 1979); 121 CONG. REc. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Such a situation
may occur when there is no administrative procedure available to address individual grievances,
480 F. Supp. at 228; when the administrative procedure can address only a portion of a party's
claim, id.; when the administrative procedure addresses individual complaints but cannot provide
an appropriate remedy, Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); when the administrative procedure is unable to consider or redress the claims of
a class, Medley v. Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294, 1309 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); and when exhaustion
would be futile, id.; 121 CONG. REc. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). And exhaustion
may not be required when administrative remedies comparable to those provided by the Act have
been exhausted, Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1110-11 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
98. This method of proceeding may be proper when the court feels that although a prior
administrative proceeding was ineffective or was not carried out in good faith, such a proceeding
can now be used with confidence under the watchful eye of the court. See Krass,supra note 34, at
1052.
99. The doctrine originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907). For a general discussion of the doctrine's application, see Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1964).
100. For purposes of the present discussion, the term "administrative agency" can be considered analogous to the nonjudicial decision-makers provided for by the Act. See note 96 supra.
101. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 496 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1974). The
doctrine has been addressed in cases arising under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1976). See Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (W.D.N.Y. 1979);
Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 116-17 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
102. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 496 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1974).
103. Cf. North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 140 (D.D.C. 1979)
(because a neglect proceeding would itself have a "devastating impact" on the child's problem,
resort must be had to placement through parents or through the board of education).
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and agency' °4 and conserving judicial resources. °5 The difficult evidentiary questions relating to educational and fiscal policy likely to
arise in cases under the Act 0 6 further suggest the benefit of deferral to
an agency, though for the most part courts are competent to resolve
these questions. 10 7 Despite these cautionary considerations, a court
should not be hesitant to exercise the overseeing role Congress intended it to have. 08 In failing to provide clear substantive guidelines,
104. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 496 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1974).
105. A court should refer a case to an administrative proceeding if it appears that the court's
resolution of the merits would do little more than settle an internal bureaucratic dispute more
properly decided at the bureaucratic level. See Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173-74 (D. Del.
1980), aft'dsub nonL Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981);
North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979).
Referral under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is properly raised on the court's own motion. Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 116 (W.D. Pa. 1978); see Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 542 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'don othergrounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
106. Authorities agree that courts must be cautious in assessing the substantive requirements
of an individual child's education. Such an assessment involves matters of educational judgment
that approach the "perimeter of judicial competence." Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). Accord, Harris v.
Campbell, 472 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D. Va. 1979). A court must rely on expert testimony in most
cases, especially when medical and psychological evaluations are at issue. Yet a court should be
careful not to rely too heavily on expert testimony in determining the ultimate issue of whether all
feasible services necessary for self-sufficiency have been provided in a particular case. For example, in In re "A" Family, 602 P.2d 157, 167 (Mont. 1979), the court held that it was inappropriate
for counselfor the superintendent of public instruction to request at trial the opinion of a physician about the appropriateness of the plaintiff child's placement, where the placement had become
final and had been approved by hearing officers at both the local level and the superintendent
level A court must also be cautious when experts disagree about which rehabilitative services
constitute the "state of the Act." See, e.g., Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aft'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), appealpending,49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1980)
(No. 80-1002). The unique financial and administrative characteristics of the individual school
system may require a similarly cautious reliance on expert testimony. See Note, supra note 46, at
1127.
107. See Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd,632 F.2d 945
(2d Cir. 1980), appealpending, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1980) (No. 80-1002). See also
Handel, supra note 47, at 370-73.
108. Section 5(a) of the Act provides for ultimate review of a placement decision by a state or
federal court, but does not specify the scope of review. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). Courts
generally have made a broad review both of procedural and substantive issues. The statutory
language supports the Courts' broad approach. See Note, supra note 11, at 147-48. An extensive
scope of review is necessary because the Act, although giving wide authority to state and local
agencies to create individual education programs, does not provide clear substantive guidelines.
See notes 16-44 supra and accompanying text. The Act therefore requires readily available judicial review to ensure that states and localities, while adhering to the letter of the Act's procedural
requirements, do not frustrate the Act's substantive goals. See Note, supra note 46, at 1109-10.
Special considerations of federalism come into play when cases under the Act are brought in
federal court. See note 84 supra. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court
held that in order to avoid undue federal intrusion into state decision-making, federal courts will
not enjoin state-court criminal proceedings. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDRAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4251 (1978). The Younger rationale was extended in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), to forbid federal injunctions against state or local administrative

Vol. 1981:516]

EDUCATION.FOR THE HANDICA4PPED

533

Congress may simply have expected too much of local educational
agencies; 10 9 it is therefore sometimes necessary for courts to step in.
In rendering a decision on the merits, a court should require the

handicapped plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that his educational program does not include all components necessary to achieve

the maximum self-sufficiency reasonable in his case. The burden then
shifts to the institutional defendant to show that the Act does not re-

quire the child's program to include the disputed service, because the
particular service is infeasible, unreasonable, or otherwise exceeds the
full educational opportunity required by the Act."'1 In all cases, the

Act's goal of the maximum self-sufficiency reasonable in the particular
case remains firm. Thus, even when the Act does not require that a

particular service be a part of the child's educational program, the Act
does require self-sufficiency to be the aim of the remaining services

comprising the child's program.I This standard of review would give
complainants ready access to the courts while providing local educa-

tional authorities with ample opportunity to justify their exercise of discretion. Whether the court adopts this or some other standard of

review, the court should consider the broad concern of preserving the
local nature of education as it weighs the criteria that determine
whether an individual child's educational program must include a particular service, and therefore whether the state or local educational
agency is providing an education aimed at self-sufficiency in compli2
ance with the Act."
agencies. On its face, Rizzo seems to preclude virtually any federal review of state or local educational decisions under the Act. However, the Rizzo rule has been questioned as overly broad.
See, ag., The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56, 238-47 (1976). See also Note,
Rizzo v. Goode: FederalRemediesforPolice Misconduct, 62 VA. L. REv. 1259, 1277-83 (1976). In
addition, Congress has explicitly given the federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976), and the many federal decisions under the Act suggest that
Younger and Rizzo are not substantial obstacles to federal review. The most compelling argument, however, is that because the Younger doctrine is aimed at avoiding federal interference in
state procedures, federal abstention under the Act is not usually necessary. Federal review is not
available under the Act until state-level administrative action, see notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text, is completed. See note 97 supra and accompanying text. See Medley v. Ginsberg, 492
F. Supp. 1294, 1309-10 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (Younger abstention inapplicable because no state
proceedings were pending at the time suit under the Act was initiated). But see Scruggs v. Campbell, 630 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1980 ) (federal abstention is proper when the party aggrieved by state
agency action brought suit in a state court after the opposing party had initiated a federal action,
since 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976) grants a right of review to the aggrievedparty).
109. See Note, supra note 46, at 1109.
110. See Comment, Legal Remediesfor the Misclassficationor WrongfulPlacement of Educationally HandicappedChildren, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 389, 422-28 (1979) (suggesting that
the burden of persuasion should generally be on the school). See note 138 infra.
111. See notes 69-78 supra and accompanying text.
112. One court has suggested that, as long as the child's interests are not harmed, a court
should allow the local agency leeway in placing the child as necessary to ensure continued receipt
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A CHILD'S
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM MUST INCLUDE A
PARTICULAR SERVICE

A court must consider several aspects of a situation when deciding
whether the Act requires a particular educational service to be included
in a child's educational program. Some of these are unique to the par-

concerns present in virtually
ticular case while others represent1 broader
13
every case arising under the Act.
A.

The Individual Child

The first determination a court must make is whether the child is
in fact handicapped within the meaning of the Act.1 14 The Act provides no remedy for those children not considered handicapped. If the
court finds that the child was handicapped at the time of the placement
decision, it must then decide whether the defendants knew or had reason to know of the child's handicap.115 The answer will often turn on

whether the defendant has complied with the Act's procedural requirements' 1 6 and may affect the nature of relief appropriate to the case.'7

of federal funds under the Act. See In re Juvenile Case No. 1089, 119 N.H. 64, 398 A.2d 65, 68
(1979). In that case the Act's procedural requirements would have been violated, thus jeopardizing the school's receipt of federal funds, if either the child's foster family or the state division of
welfare alone, rather than the school district, had been permitted to choose the child's educational
program. For that reason, the court ordered that the school district be allowed to determine the
child's placement.
113. The individualized approach urged in this comment in no way precludes class actions
under the Act. Violations of the Act that are severe enough to affect an entire class of handicapped children usually involve violations of the Act's procedural, rather than substantive, provisions. For example, the Battle court held that Pennsylvania's 180-day rule violated the procedural
rights of the plaintiff class. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 279-80 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). See also id. at 281 (Van Dusen, J.,
concurring); id. at 284 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in part). See notes 36-46 supra and
accompanying text. The district court found the 180-day rule to violate the substantive rights of
the plaintiff class as well. See Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1979), modifled
sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S.
June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). Other class actions have been brought under the Act. See, e.g., Lora
v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.
Va.), vacated and remanded,434 U.S. 808 (1977).
114. See note 3 supra. See generally S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 10, 26, reprintedin
[1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1434, 1450 ("The Committee is deeply concerned
about practices and procedures which result in classifying children as having handicapping conditions when, in fact, they do not have such conditions").
115. See Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1,478 F. Supp. 418, 431-32 (D. Minn. 1979) (the
mere fact that school officials suspected that the plaintiff was handicapped is not sufficient to
invoke the requirements of the Act).
116. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text.
117. Compare Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 636,
638 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (finding that the school district had engaged in a "calculated, deliberate effort
to avoid its legal responsibility" to provide an adequate education to the plaintiff under the Reha-
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Once it is clear that the child is handicapped, the court must determine whether the child's affliction makes special educational services
necessary.1 18 Although the Act covers a wide variety of disabilities,1 1 9
there may be cases in which the child can benefit from the educational
programs under the Act only if he receives services that are outside the
Act's purview.' 20 A court should not require a school district to provide a service if the effectiveness of that service depends upon another
12 1
service that is not required by the Act and is otherwise unavailable.
In most cases, however, the mere fact that a child needs non-educational services does not relieve the state of its duty under the Act.122
After the court has determined that the child needs educational or
therapeutic services, it must consider the degree of self-sufficiency that
the child can potentially achieve.' 23 The greater the degree of potential
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), and under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution; suggesting that personal liability be imposed on the responsible
school officials), with Harris v. Campbell, 472 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D. Va. 1979) (the school district's
"extensive efforts" to educate the handicapped plaintiff made the court unable to find that the
school district had failed or refused to provide an appropriate education for the plaintiff).
118. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976) (limiting the Act's coverage to children whose handicaps
"require special education and related services"). See also North v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 140 (D.D.C. 1979) (the board of education disclaimed responsibility for
providing services, on the grounds that the plaintiff's problems were non-educational); Kruelle v.
Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D. Del. 1980) (same), a 'd sub nom. Kruelle v. New Castle County
School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
119. See note 3 supra.
120. Such a situation may arise, for example, in the case of a child whose complete lack of an
immune response requires him to live in a bacteriologically sterile environment. See The Bubble
Boy, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1978, at 16. While the Act should require in-home instruction for the
child, it should not require the school to construct on school property a sterile "bubble house" like
that in the child's home. Nonetheless, given the courts' generally broad interpretation of the Act,
it would not be surprising for a court to decide that the school must in fact provide such a structure. Cf. Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1979), vacatedandremanded,625 F.2d 557
(5th Cir. 1980) (In Tatro the district court held that the Act did not require the school district to
provide catheterization for the plaintiffs child. Because of a neurogenic bladder condition, the
child needed catheterization every three or four hours during the school day. On appeal, the court
held that catheterization is a "supportive service" required by the Act. 625 F.2d at 562). The
"related services" required by the Act include transportation and supportive services for diagnostic and evaluative purposes. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13
(1979).
121. If the child's parents, however, are willing to provide the service not required by the Act,
the court should be free to order the school district to provide the accompanying service.
122. See, e.g., Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1980), af'dsub nom. Kruelle v. New
Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp.
528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), appealpending,49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S.
Dec. 15, 1980) (No. 80-1002). North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 126
(D.D.C. 1979); In re "A" Family, 602 P.2d 157 (Mont. 1979); Smith v. Cumberland School
Comm., 415 A.2d 168 (R-I. 1980).
123. The emphasis of this comment is upon those cases in which maximum self-sufficiency
satisfies the goal of full educational opportunity. Handicapped children who achieve self-sufficiency have the right to receive, as part of their full educational opportunity, whatever services are
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self-sufficiency, the more important it is that the school be required to
make every reasonable effort toward that end. 124 A court must be espe-

cially careful not to let the present level of the child's educational program unrealistically diminish its view of what level of self-sufficiency is
possible.125
A court should also consider whether and to what extent the child

is likely to suffer if his educational program does not include the disputed service. If irreparable injury is likely, 126 the particular service
should be a mandatory part of the child's education. Conversely, evi-

dence that the child can easily recoup any losses resulting from the
exclusion of a particular service indicates that the court should be less

quick to require the state to provide the service.127
Allegations that a handicapped child presents a disciplinary problem at the school pose an especially delicate issue. 128 In such cases

necessary to enable them to reach their maximum educational potential, even if such services are
beyond the goal of self-sufficiency. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
124. Both the lower court and the dissenting judge in the court of appeals in Battle recognized
that the Act does not require a school to go to unreasonable extremes in providing an education
aimed at self-sufficiency. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1979), modofledsub
nono Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 286 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). See notes 37-46
supra and accompanying text.
125. See 80 HARv. L. Rav. 898, 902 (1967).
126. The existence of irreparable injury, usually involving lost developmental time for the
child, is important in determining when injunctive relief is appropriate. A temporary restraining
order generally requires the plaintiff to show that immediate and irreparable injury win result
before the defendant can be fully heard in opposition. See D. DOBBS, REmEDIES 108-10 (1975).
This form of relief is appropriate only in a few cases, such as where an irremediably harmful
change in the child's placement is imminent. See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (D.
Conn. 1978) (finding two injuries: exclusion from both traditional and special educational programs).
A preliminary injunction requires that the plaintiff demonstrate either (1) probable success on
the merits of the claim and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits of the claim and a balance of hardship tipped in the plaintiffs favor. Triebwasser &
Katz v. AT&T Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976). Preliminary injunctions have been issued
in cases arising under the Act primarily to prevent a change in a child's placement, see, e.g.,
Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980); Vogel v. School Bd., 491 F. Supp. 989
(W.D. Mo. 1980), or to obtain a necessary change in the placement, see, eg., Howard S. v.
Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978). A mandamus has
been issued for the same purposes. See, eg., In re "A" Family, 602 P.2d 157 (Mont. 1979).
127. This consideration is important in determining the nature of relief, especially when a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought. See, ag., Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F.
Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978) (a temporary restraining order was necessary because an imminent
change in the child's placement threatened her with irreparable harm). Monetary damage alone is
unlikely to constitute irreparable harm sufficient to justify issuance of preliminary relief. See
Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Neb. 1980).
128. In some cases the child's disciplinary problems are symptomatic of his handicap. See
Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228-29 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent
School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 635 (S.D. Tex. 1978). In other cases, the educational program itself
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school district defendants frequently claim, with some justification, that

the child has been removed from a needed educational program because he threatens the safety of himself or other students and teach-

ers, 129 or disrupts classes so that the education of other children is
impaired.' 30 The Act's implementing regulations suggest that the Act's
prohibition of a change in a child's placement while a complaint proceeding is pending 31 was not meant to "preclude a school from using
its normal procedures for dealing with children who are endangering
themselves or others."'132 Courts have generally held that although a
school may not expel a handicapped student,

33

it may suspend the

34 or

transfer the child to a more restrictive
child on an emergency basis
35
The Act is satisfied by a program that includes fewer
environment.
than all elements necessary to achieve maximum self-sufficiency if

those missing elements are available only in the educational setting
from which the child had to be removed.
B.

The School System.

In determining the extent to which a school must provide an education aimed at maximum self-sufficiency, a court should also consider
the character of the school system or state. The adequacy of a handi-

capped child's education can be judged to some degree by a comparison with the education given to normal children.' 36 If a lack of local

resources results in relatively low educational goals for healthy children, then correspondingly low goals for handicapped children may be
acceptable.

13 7

may cause the disciplinary problem. See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (D. Conn.
1978); Frederick v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
129. See Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
130. See Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979). The Act's implementing
regulations state that a child's education "would not be appropriate" when he is so disruptive that
the "education of other students is significantly impaired." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.552 (1979) (comment). See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978).
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976).
132. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.513 (1979). The comment to the regulation states that schools should be
allowed to use their regular procedures for dealing with emergencies. Id.
133. See Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979). See also Stuart v. Nappi, 443
F. Supp. 1235, 1241-42 (D. Conn. 1978).
134. See Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
See also Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (D. Conn. 1978).
135. Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
136. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). See also Note, supra note 46, at 1125-27.
137. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aj'd,632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), appealpending,49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec.
15, 1980) (No. 80-1002); Note, supra note 46, at 1125-27.
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The court must also weigh the financial resources of the school
system or state.1 38 A particular educational service cannot be
mandatory when the school system simply cannot afford to provide the
service.' 39 Moreover, the level of local educational and administrative
expertise may often make infeasible a particular service that is necessary to achieve maximum self-sufficiency. 40 To make that service a
mandatory part of the child's educational program is useless when the
school lacks the professional skill and management necessary to implement that service. A school that can afford to hire the appropriate personnel, however, must do so.141
C. Compliance with Statutory Procedure.
The Act establishes procedures to be followed in diagnosing
handicaps, designing individualized education programs, and administering the remedial provisions available to aggrieved children.' 42 In
determining the adequacy of a child's education under the Act, a court
should consider the actual procedure that the school used in designing
the educational program at issue. The more questionable the school's
adherence to the Act's procedural requirements was, the less likely it is
that the school dealt with the child in good faith. 43 The school's lack
of good faith in turn detracts from the reliability of the individualized
educational program that the school developed. 144 When it is unclear
whether the school knew that the child was handicapped, the school's
proper use of procedure becomes especially important in determining
138. The financial impact of a child's educational program may also be a factor in allocating
the burden of proof. See Comment, supra note 110, at 421 (suggesting placing a heavier burden of
persuasion on the school district if its placement decision is more convenient in terms of cost or
resources). See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
140. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 33, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1457 ("The Committee is aware that there is a shortage of fully qualified personnel
trained to serve all handicapped children in educational programs"); Note, supra note 46, at 1110.
The history of the Act's implementing regulations suggests that it is appropriate for a court to
consider the local availability of educational services. As initially proposed, the regulations would
have required the school district to determine a child's individualized education program "without
regard to the availability of those services." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,970 (1976). The final regulation,
however, deleted the reference to the availability of services. 42 C.F.R. § 121a.346(c) (1979). See
Amicus, Sept. 1977, at 6.
141. See Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980); Rowley v. Board ofEduc., 483 F. Supp.
528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), appealpending, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S.
Dec. 15, 1980) (No. 80-1002); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1339
(W.D.N.Y. 1979).
142. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 117 supra.
144. Id.
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whether the school had reason to know of the handicap. 145 That determination affects the degree of culpability attaching to the school's failand therefore affects the kind of
ure to diagnose the child's condition,
46
case.'
the
in
appropriate
relief
An examination of the actual procedure that was used in diagnosing a child's condition and designing his educational program is useful
in revealing whether the questioned placement decision-the diagnosis
and its resultant educational program-was made on non-educational
grounds. As already noted, a placement made for non-educational reasons such as discipline may comply with the Act in some circumstances
even though the resulting educational program does not include every
element necessary for maximum self-sufficiency. 147 In most situations,
take precedence over decisions
however, the requirements of the Act
148
made on non-educational grounds.
Finally, the court must carefully determine whether the procedures that were followed, even if proper in form, adequately protected
the interests of the child. Because the Act depends largely on parental
involvement in the decision-making process, 49 a court should examine
whether the child's parents were able to use the Act's remedial procedures effectively.' 50 Many parents are unable to afford a lawyer to assist in dealing with the Act's appeal process,15' and in such cases the
court should give less credence to the result of the administrative appeal if it was unfavorable to the child.
D. General Considerations.
In deciding whether the goal of maximum self-sufficiency has been
met in a particular case, a court may look to cases arising in similar
districts or states.' 52 Similarities in other districts may also guide the
school system in implementing the court's decision. Rarely, if ever, will
two courts be presented with cases involving the same handicapping
condition in the same educational context; courts should therefore draft
their opinions narrowly to avoid creating inappropriately broad prece145. See Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 431-32 (D. Minn. 1979).
146. See note 117 supra.
147. See notes 128-35 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Note, supra note 46, at 1111-12.
151. Id. 1111.
152. See Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D. Del. 1980), af'dsub nonm Kruelle v. New
Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). But see note 106 supra.
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dents.153
A final practical consideration relates to the unpleasant economic
realities of education for the handicapped. Generally, the more severe
a child's handicap, the more it costs society to care for the child over
the course of his life if he is not made self-sufficient.15 4 By the same
token, the more severe the handicap, the more it costs society to educate the child to self-sufficiency. 55 Congress has determined that it is
in the national interest to educate handicapped children to self-sufficiency.' 56 Nonetheless, a court may consider the relative costs in a
given case. A particular educational service necessary to maximize
self-sufficiency should not be required when the massively expensive
service, although affordable by the school system, will leave the handicapped person's dependence on societal support relatively unchanged.
Finally, a court must recognize that the expensive education that handicapped children require does sacrifice to some extent the education
available to normal children.' 5 7 A particular service necessary to maximize a handicapped child's self-sufficiency should not be mandatory
when the detriment to society resulting from the lost education for normal children outweighs society's gain in providing a particular kind of
education for the handicapped child. A court is not free to substitute
its view for the intent of Congress expressed in the national policy goals
set by the Act,1 58 but the considerations of relative cost and sacrificed
resources are relevant criteria in extreme cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The diversity of handicapping conditions and of local educational
resources, and a desire to preserve local control of education led Congress to employ flexible language in drafting the Education for All
153. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) (Van Dusen, J., concurring)

(the judge concurred "to emphasize ...

the limited nature of our holding in this case"), ceri.

denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827).

154. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 9, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1433.
155. A handicapped child is, on the average, approximately twice as expensive to educate as a

normal child. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 47, at 15, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1425, 1439. Congress has authorized appropriations for the Act of $236.5 million for
1981 and $247.5 million for 1982. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-49, §§ 2-6, 91 Stat. 230 (1977) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1426 (Supp. III 1979)).
156. See note 17 supra.

157. Because the Act does not pay for the entire cost of a handicapped child's education,
educational programs under the Act necessarily consume state or local financial resources otherwise available for the education of normal children. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying
text.
158. Israel v. Motor Vessel Nili, 435 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
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Handicapped Children Act of 1975.159 The Act's legislative history
reveals that Congress intended maximum self-sufficiency for the handicapped to be the mimimum goal of education under the Act, while allowing state and local governments to set incremental goals toward that
end. 160

In determining whether the content of a child's education satisfies
the self-sufficiency requirement and thereby brings a state into compli-

ance with the Act, a court should require the state to provide every
educational service necessary to enable the child to achieve the maximum level of self-sufficiency that is reasonable in his case.1 6 1 Courts

should recognize the traditionally local nature of educational policy
formulation and should temper their concern for the child's well-being
with an awareness of the need to preserve a proper relationship between the court and the community.

Ultimately, Congress should make a clear policy statement by
amending the Act to require states to provide, at the least, every service
reasonably necessary to maximize self-sufficiency.1 62 Courts can then

more easily apply the Act to secure the rights of handicapped children.
John S. Harrison

159. 20 U.S.C. §§4401-1420 (1976).
160. See notes 69-78 supra and accompanying text. But see Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d
269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-827). In light of
the Act's legislative history and the unique need for flexible statutory language, the position of the
majority in Batle--that the Act does not mandate the goal of maximum self-sufficiency--is unpersuasive.
161. See note 123 supra.
162. Such a statement would simplify to some degree the courts' task. A clear expression of a
mandatory goal of maximum self-sufficiency would also lead to more faithful implementation of
the Act. Such a mandate would be more difficult for a local school official to ignore than a flexible
rule, especially when a violation can jeopardize the receipt of federal funds. See 20 U.S.C. § 1416
(1976). See Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). In
addition, parental involvement would be more effective because clear guidelines would make it
more evident when a child's rights were being violated. See Note, supra note 46, at I110.

